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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper uses examples to demonstrate the generality of issues resulting from the heterogeneity 
of a population. Heterogeneity is fundamental to the marketing strategy of any firm. If one market 
segment is more expensive to service, then members of that segment might be charged higher 
prices or be left to one’s competitors. We pay particular attention to heterogeneity issues in 
financial services, specifically, insurance underwriting, lending, and investing. We examine 
techniques that practitioners use to assess heterogeneity in a population with respect to loss 
events. We employ the
2 -goodness of fit test to assess whether observations in risk classes (sub 
partitions of population) are relatively homogenous.  We use a sign-rank test to assess whether or 
not two loss distributions from different risk classes were drawn from the same probability 
distribution. We discuss how mutual ownership and price fixing have evolved as built-in safety 
nets to cope with modeling limitations. 
 
 
IDENTIFICATION 
 
his paper uses examples to demonstrate the generality of issues resulting from the heterogeneity of a 
population. Heterogeneity is fundamental to the marketing strategy of any firm. If one market 
segment is more expensive to services, then members of that segment might be charged higher prices 
or be left to one‟s competitors. We pay particular attention to heterogeneity issues in financial services, specifically, 
insurance underwriting, lending, and investing. We demonstrate the generality of adverse (beneficial) selection 
issues through examples. Where applicable, we distinguish pure adverse selection concerns from moral hazard 
problems, in particular, principal-agent conflicts. 
 
Definitions 
 
When two parties in a transaction, or more generally a contract, have access to the same observations and 
analysis, we say there is symmetric information.  When this is not the case, we say there is asymmetric information.  
Often, one party is better informed than the other party – and this asymmetry may induce adverse selection and 
moral hazard concerns that we describe below. 
 
An adverse (beneficial) selection is a non-representative, that is, biased sample drawn from a 
heterogeneous population that is adverse (beneficial) to an economic agent. For definiteness, we need to specify how 
we assess the heterogeneity and in what sense we mean the selection is adverse (beneficial).  
 
Principal-agent problems occur when one party, the principal, contracts with a second party, the agent, to 
delegate a task to the principal.  The agent chooses to maximize his/her own benefit from the contract at the expense 
of the principal‟s benefit.  The principal‟s benefit cannot be completely protected due to the principal‟s inability to 
monitor the agent perfectly (Kane 1999A).   
 
Principal-agent problems are moral hazard problems.  Defined from the principal‟s perspective, a moral 
hazard problem is a disadvantageous change in an agent‟s behavior due to the existence of an implicit or explicit 
contract.  For example, an agent who buys fire insurance from an insurance company, the principal, may no longer 
be as prudent about preventing fires, because the agent is insured against a fire loss.  Consequently, the probability 
T 
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of that agent incurring a fire loss has increased due to the existence of the contract (Kane 1999A).  Indeed, this is 
one reason why insurance companies often insist on deductibles that keep the policy holder partially exposed to 
losses. 
 
Diverse Examples 
 
Market for Lemons 
 
George Akerlof (1970) wrote a 2001 Noble prize winning paper on adverse selection. He argued that very 
young but used cars tend to be lemons (defective). After all, why would someone trade in a car that was less than a 
year old unless it was a lemon?  He suggested that is one reason why new cars lose over 10% of their value when a 
customer drives them off the car lot. Akerlof also suggested that warrantees from credible sources will lead to price 
premiums, because they will reduce uncertainty for buyers. 
 
Senior Communities 
  
Some counties seek to develop communities for older citizens who tend to require less expensive services 
at the county level. Crofton Colony in Anne Arundel County MD, located between Baltimore MD and Washington 
DC, is an example. Through deed restrictions, homeowners agree to have no one under eighteen living in their 
household for more than six months. Thus, there is less need for primary and secondary education services. Older 
citizens do have a greater need for healthcare, but this is less expensive and is funded more at the city, state, and 
federal levels. Consequently, Anne Arundel County can maintain lower real estate taxes than surrounding counties, 
because the county has garnered a beneficial selection of older citizens. 
 
Teacher Evaluations 
 
At Suffolk University, as at many institutions of higher learning, the administration requires that teachers 
hand out evaluation forms each semester to students.  Teachers may desire a higher score on their evaluations from 
their students. At Suffolk University the teacher selects an evaluation day near the end of the semester. The author 
has found it beneficial to strategically choose when to hand out the student evaluations. Through empirical trial and 
error, the author has found the class before Thanksgiving vacation during fall semester to generate a beneficial 
selection of students attending class (the more serious students), and the last class before the final or immediately 
before the final exam (all the students) to generate a less beneficial selection of students. 
 
 Instructors may receive better teaching evaluations from students in an elective course taken by students 
majoring in the field than in required course taken by many students who are majoring in other fields. With an 
elective course, the students often choose to take the course with an instructor over taking other elective courses 
with other instructors (self-selection). Because the elective course is in the students‟ major, the students may be 
more interested in the subjects. Further, the students may take more care in selecting the instructor than non-majors 
in required courses. We note that the material is more likely to be in the instructor‟s area of expertise. Thus, the 
instructor may teach better, too. This last reason for better evaluations is not beneficial selection per se, because it 
may not directly affect the population of students evaluating an instructor. 
  
Compensation for Professors 
 
Slackoff State University (SSU)
1
 has a heterogeneous faculty.  Some members are highly productive while 
other members are much less so.  In order to "prune the dead wood," SSU's President is planning to offer an early 
retirement package.  Rumors about the package have circulated among the faculty.  A few less productive professors 
plan to accept SSU's offer and retire, while many of the most productive professors plan to do so and accept similar 
positions at other universities.   
                                                 
1 Slackoff State University is the home of the beloved mascot, Sammy the Sloth. 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – March 2005                                                       Volume 3, Number 3 
 11 
As an economist, what advice should one give SSU's President?  Less productive members of the faculty 
have little reason to leave while more productive professors will take the package and leave. Thus, there will be an 
adverse selection problem. It may appear that SSU has acquired an adverse draw from the population of professors, 
but the lack of productivity may be due to a principal-agent conflict and not an adverse selection problem per se. A 
better solution might be for the principal (University Administration) to monitor the agents (Professors) better. Less 
productive professors may be identified and let go if they don‟t have tenure.2  If they do have tenure, they can be 
paid less or at least not given raises. Further, there should be a way to give incentives such as cash awards and bonus 
programs to increase the productivity, that is, to tie the remuneration of professors to their production. 
 
Additionally, SSU‟s mathematics department salary compensation scheme does not distinguish whether or 
not a professor is a theoretical or applied mathematician. This scheme has garnered an adverse draw of theoreticians 
who find SSU‟s compensation relatively attractive to other universities that pay theoreticians less than applied 
mathematicians. The salary difference at other universities may be attributable to the tendency of applied 
mathematicians: to have better employment opportunities themselves outside of academia, to garner better 
employment opportunities for their students, to sustain a research agenda longer, to be more able to garner outside 
funding, to be preferred by students as teacher due to their practical approach, and to be preferred by faculty in 
business, the sciences, and engineering as colleagues.  
 
Again, as an economist, what advice should one give SSU‟s President?  Similar to other universities, the 
compensation scheme might discriminate in favor of applied mathematicians over theoreticians.  With a 
mathematics department dominated by theoreticians who would have substantial control over the hiring process, it 
may be difficult to hire and pay applied mathematicians more, since theoreticians may sabotage this process. 
Consequently, the President might establish an applied mathematics department in a separate college.
3
  The 
compensation scheme for the new department might have a lower base salary and have more incentives for 
garnering outside funding and for doing a quality job when teaching.  This will make working in the applied 
department less attractive for a theoretician, but more attractive to an applied mathematics professor.  Thus, it may 
be possible to attract a beneficial selection of applied mathematicians into the new department. When attrition does 
eliminate professors in the theoretical department, the administration might respond to student demand for courses 
and add positions for new professors in the applied department. Further, since the current salary of theoretical 
professors is likely to be much higher than similar theoretical mathematicians at other universities, the 
administration might not give raises to professors in the theoretical mathematics department until they begin to 
garner offers from other universities. 
 
Market Niches 
 
Due to the heterogeneity in market niches, there are adverse selection concerns.  
 
Pooling without Discrimination 
 
Many companies who underwrite life insurance contracts require applicants to undergo a medical 
examination. Based on the findings, a premium is established dependent on the health and future risks of the 
participant. Without requiring a physical, an insurance company might offer life insurance to almost everyone. 
Those not willing or able to pass a medical exam would be able to participate and obtain a life insurance policy.  The 
insurance companies will have to charge significantly higher monthly premiums to be compensated for the increased 
risk. Customers may become loyal to their insurance company. The insurer may still prosper because its premiums 
are higher than that of companies who require physicals to separate customers into various risk classes with gradated 
premiums.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Tenure is a guarantee of permanent job for the career of professor by a University. 
3 Indeed, would the salary of finance professors be significantly higher than the salary of economics professors if they were not in a separate 
college of business? 
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Creditworthiness 
 
The managing director for credit risk at a bank recommends to senior management that they raise the 
interest rates on their credit cards to increase profits. He theorizes that higher rates will mean higher revenues, but 
that costs will remain roughly the same. Unfortunately, by raising the interest rates, the managing director forced 
many of his profitable customers to leave the company, and to take with them their low default rates, to seek better 
arrangements elsewhere. This left behind those customers who were unable to leave because they have bad credit 
(high default risk). The default rate for the bank increased sharply for the remaining credit card customers. By 
increasing the rates, the managing director increased the probability of default on the remaining customers and lost 
profitable customers. These losses were not offset by the higher interest rates charged.   
 
Emerging Markets 
 
There are transparency and asymmetric information concerns with emerging stock and bond markets, for 
instance, in Eastern Europe. If investors cannot determine which companies are better due to a lack of quality 
information, the market may be forced to value good and bad companies similarly.  This may mean that good 
companies may have to pay a higher cost of capital than if investors benefited from a better corporate governance 
regime. 
 
This is not a pure adverse selection problem, however. There is not a strong corporate governance system 
in place, that is, legal infrastructure, accounting disclosure, recourse for debt holders in U.S. bankruptcy courts, 
insider trading restrictions, shareholder control over the board of trustees, well established stock market exchanges, 
and enforcement. Debt holders value enforceable covenants and recourse in bankruptcy proceedings. Managers may 
need to bond themselves better with shareholders‟ interest thus reducing principal-agent conflicts. While this 
bonding includes accounting disclosure that would improve transparency and reduce adverse selection concerns, 
there are other performance benefits derived from a better corporate governance regime. These performance benefits 
may result, in part, from executive stock options, more shareholder control of the board of trustees, and the potential 
for shareholder class action law suits in U.S. courts. These mechanisms help to align the interest of management 
with shareholders (Coffee 1999, Blodgett and Kane 2003). 
 
Interest Rate Risk 
 
We suppose a city has only two financial institutions, Vary Thrift and Fixy Bank. Both institutions offer 
customers the choice between an adjustable rate mortgage (varies with the rate on the ten year U.S. Treasury) and a 
fixed rate mortgage (interest rate does not vary over the life of the mortgage). Vary Thrift‟s chief economist 
forecasts that interest rates will go up in the future. Consequently, Vary Thrift substantially reduces the origination 
fee on their adjustable rate mortgage and substantially increases the fee for the fixed rate mortgage. Vary Thrift is 
trying to reduce the interest rate risk of its new loans by originating more adjustable mortgages. If Fixy Bank agrees 
with the forecast but does not react, it may not be in business very long -- especially if rates rise and sustain at that 
level for a long period of time. If Fixy Bank does not modify its business strategy, it may get an adverse draw of 
fixed rate mortgage customers. Fixed rate loans (assets) will not offset the higher rate depositors‟ payments 
(liabilities) unless Fixy Bank has hedged its interest rate risk.
4
  This scenario occurred in the 1970s and 1980s with 
many Savings and Loans who did not hedge their interest rate risk nor securitize many of the mortgages.
5
  
 
New Banking Entrant 
 
A large bank holding company might open a branch in a small town to drive an incumbent small bank out 
of business. The large bank might only have a slight advantage in economies of scope and scale over the incumbent 
                                                 
4We note that Fixy Bank may disagree with the prognosis of higher interest rates. Fixy Bank may make a calculated decision to cater toward fixed 
rate loans, speculating that interest rates fall or remain steady.  If this is the case, then Fixy Bank will have garnered a beneficial selection of 
customers.   
5 This is less of a problem today, because most originators securitize many of the mortgages in response to risk-based capital requirements (Kane 
and Muzere, 2004). 
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small bank, however, because the incumbent bank may outsource to obtain a similar level of economies of scope 
and scale (Kane, Laosinchai, and Muzere, 2003). The small bank has an informational advantage and a loyal 
customer base (Reichheld, 2001). The new entrant would likely garner an adverse draw of less profitable customers 
from the small bank due to its informational disadvantage.  
 
Cross-Selling 
 
Chase has not been able to cross-sell its customer as well as many of its competitors who tend to have less 
wealthy and creditworthy customers. Why? There is a lot of competition for wealthy and creditworthy customers. 
These customers tend to have well-established relationships with insurance agents, stock brokers, and mutual fund 
managers (Reichheld, 2001). Competition also reduces the ability to cross-sell and the profitability resulting from 
cross-selling.  
 
Pawn brokering 
 
How does a pawn shop service a niche that commercial banking does not service? Jack Daugherty, the 
founder and C.E.O. of Cash America, the largest pawn chain in the U.S., remarked to a journalist, “I could take my 
customers and put them on a bus and drive them down to a bank and the bank would laugh at them.  That is why 
they‟re my customers (Caskey, 1994).”  The bank does not want these customers because they have high credit risk 
that would require collateral to mitigate. The loans are for small amounts, and this makes it not worth the bank‟s 
trouble to process the loans.  The bank faces a usury ceiling that limits the amount of interest that the bank could 
charge. Additionally, the bank may have a problem holding small denomination assets as collateral as well as selling 
unclaimed assets. 
 
Credit Margins 
 
The expansion of credit margins tends to produce sustained adverse selection concerns for lenders. A 
bank‟s target customers may fit into the non-conforming market segment, because these borrowers may generate 
higher origination fees.  A non-conforming borrower might be someone with slow credit or a high debt to income 
ratio, or the borrower might be self-employed and have little or no traceable income. A bank may market its sub 
prime mortgages using direct mail and telemarketing.  The high interest rate and origination fees discourage 
borrowers who qualified for conforming mortgages that may have lower rates and fees at other lending institutions. 
For instance, a bank might buy consumer marketing lists that are composed primarily of weak credits, or a bank may 
target borrowers for whom they had originated their loans previously and then subsequently sold their loans to other 
sub prime lenders.  These strategies may produce many unfruitful loan applications, however. If a bank had granted 
the borrower a second mortgage, then the bank may be marketing to a borrower who had refinanced to a threshold 
where the borrower did not have enough equity to take on an additional mortgage or to refinance the borrower‟s 
preexisting mortgage to lower the payments. To a bank‟s benefit, however, the bank may also find and process some 
applicants who could have taken a conforming mortgage from another bank if borrowers had known better.
6
   
 
Securitized Loans 
 
There is an adverse selection concern when an originator securitizes mortgages, too.  A prospective buyer 
might assume that the originator may keep the better mortgages and sell the worse ones. This is a moral hazard 
concern for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, government sponsored enterprises that buy originated mortgages and then 
securitize them in the secondary market.  Consequently, Fannie and Freddie often want an institution to sell them all 
loans that the institution originates. To protect themselves, Fannie and Freddie impose penalties on lenders when its 
purchased mortgages fail to meet a contracted benchmark standard based upon the performance of similar loans. 
 
                                                 
6This is a reverse moral hazard problem for borrowers.  To mitigate this problem, Fannie Mae makes available a tool, called the Loan Prospector, 
that lets borrowers know whether they qualify for a conforming mortgage or not. 
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Seasoned Equity 
 
Why do established firms that issue new equity have returns that tend to under perform relative to the 
returns of comparable firms in their industry? Firms that issue new equity may do so because their managers feel it‟s 
the cheapest source of funds. This may mean that managers feel that the firm‟s equity is overvalued. Because 
financial markets know this, established firms are disinclined to issue new equity (Fazzari and Hubbard, 1988). 
Consequently, successful firms tend to prefer to use retained earnings to finance new projects.  Thus, the firms that 
do issue seasoned equity tend to be poor performers. 
 
Extended Medical Insurance 
 
Why is extended medical insurance available to former employees so expensive to underwrite? Extended 
medical insurance policies have a history of generating high insurance claims per policy. Thus, actuaries need to 
charge a large premium for extended medical insurance. Many former employees will obtain health insurance from 
their new employer and will not seek more expensive extended medical insurance.  Some former employees who do 
seek extended medical insurance may do so because they have existing medical conditions that might not be covered 
by their new medical insurance policy. This population is more expensive to insure because they are more expensive 
to care for. They require more medications, more tests and procedures, and more doctor visits than most other 
patients. 
 
Implementation Shortfall 
 
A mutual fund has not been able to consummate all its planned trades due, in part, to stock price 
change/liquidity issues. Perold (1988) uses the implementation shortfall, the difference in return between a 
theoretical paper portfolio and the implemented portfolio, as an assessment tool.  Perold (1988) partitions the 
implementation shortfall into higher transactions costs to execute the planned trades and the opportunity costs of not 
transacting. The adverse selection stems from illiquidity, the inability to trade at the prevailing price when the 
market moves against a trade (Treynor 1981). This is when it is likely to be beneficial for the fund manager to trade. 
A large buy order at prevailing price could also reveal the belief of the manager that the security is undervalued. If 
other traders make inferences based on the actions of the manager, this might raise the price at which the manager 
can purchase the security. On paper the fund is able to execute a trade of $10mm at the prevailing price.  In practice, 
however, perhaps the fund may only purchase the first $1mm immediately. If the manager placed a market order, 
then the remaining $9mm of the order could execute at a less advantageous price. If the manager placed a limit 
order, then the remaining $9mm of the order would not be executed at all. In some cases a trader may choose to 
delay a portion of his/her trade; in other cases the trade may never be consummated.  In all cases, the fund manager 
will not achieve the paper strategy because of execution limitations.   
  
Exclusion 
 
Insurance exclusion discourages risky activity, because the activity undertaker cannot contract to transfer 
the risk from the activity to another entity.  From the insurer‟s perspective, this reduces moral hazard.  It also 
reduces adverse selection concerns.  For instance, a builder might elect not to build homes in a severe flood plain if 
the builder knows that subsequent homeowners may not be able to purchase flood insurance. Thus, a builder might 
not be able to earn a reasonable profit and may elect to build homes elsewhere. Consequently insurance exclusion 
reduces the amount of flood insurance claims and adverse selection concerns, since there will be fewer homes 
located in severe flood plains and insurer will not underwrite insurance for many homes located in severe flood 
plains. 
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Assessment 
 
Actuarial Models 
 
Actuarial methods are classical risk management techniques. They are based on simple ideas that have a 
sound scientific foundation. Actuarial techniques have been a pillar of the insurance industry for centuries. They 
have stood the test of time -- and we fully anticipate that they will continue to do so. Like Old Man River, the 
practice of actuarial models just keeps rolling along.   
 
Actuarial models are robust because each observation does not have much influence on the estimates. 
Transparency makes them easy to audit. If a forecast goes sour, an investigator may pinpoint what went wrong in the 
model and correct the situation.  
 
An investigator needs to assess that the observations in each risk class are reasonably homogenous with 
respect to the loss event.  Further, an investigator may not have many options when estimating models to allow for 
time variation and so forth due to the pooling observations into a few risk classes.  As a consequence trending might 
have a strong specification bias or suffer from risk class cohorts that are populated with only a few observations.   
 
Risk Classes 
 
 We seek to partition our sample into relatively homogenous risk classes with respect to loss exposure.  
How do we do this?  This is part of the „art‟ of actuarial models.  Perhaps, scientific theories, common sense, or past 
experiences show us the way. Otherwise, we might try exploratory data analysis techniques such as discriminant or 
cluster analysis on available data sets.
7
  
 
For instance, most actuaries separate out sixteen-year-old boys from other auto insurance customers.  
Sixteen-year-olds are inexperienced drivers. Most sixteen-year-old boys are undergoing puberty and lack good 
judgment. Sixteen-year-old boys have a long documented history of high risk driving.  Consequently, it makes sense 
to discriminate
8
 against sixteen-year-old boys and separate them out from other drivers and charge them higher 
premiums to reserve for the higher losses an actuary anticipates that they will generate. If an insurance company 
charged the same premium to all drivers, then they would likely garner an adverse selection of sixteen-year-old boys 
and other high risk drivers that might generate large losses to the detriment of the insurance company.  Their 
competitors may benefit, however, because they may be left with a beneficial selection of less risky drivers to 
insure. 
 
Similarly, the manufacturers of the Pontiac Firebird/Chevrolet Camaro
9
 and the Nissan 300ZX
10
 designed 
and marketed their automobiles to a customer base that was expensive to insure. They did an excellent job of 
identifying and providing the needs and desires of that market segment that wanted fast sports cars. Unfortunately, 
they created an adverse selection concern because the accident rate and damages for these cars were high. 
Consequently, the insurance premiums for these vehicles have tended to be quite high. This has left many in the 
target consumer base unwilling to purchase these automobiles, because they did not want to pay to insure them. 
 
The advent of new data sets may induce changes to risk class partitions.  For instance, when automobile 
repair centers computerized their records, it made it possible for an actuary to employ observations for the number 
                                                 
7 The „art‟ of choosing risk classes suggests that the underlying probabilities inherent in biased sampling of a heterogeneous population 
(conditional probabilities) are subjective.  See Kane (1999B) for a discussion of this issue with respect to security price changes. 
8 We note that this kind of discrimination has an economic justification.  We distinguish this discrimination from uneconomic discrimination 
which we define as discrimination that cannot be adequately supported by statistical inferences.  We argue that competition may help to mitigate 
uneconomic discrimination, since a competitor may earn above normal profits catering to uneconomically discriminated against parties. 
9 http://www.hwysafety.org/news%5Freleases/1997/pr091897.htm 
http://www.hwysafety.org/vehicle%5Fratings/ictl/ictl%5Fsport.htm 
10 http://www.hwysafety.org/vehicle%5Fratings/ictl/previous/ictl%5F0996.pdf 
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of miles that a car is driven in a year to partition drivers, since many repair centers regularly record the odometer 
reading when servicing a vehicle.
11
  
 
How might an investigator assess heterogeneity?  As an illustration, we explore whether or not a proposed 
risk class used to set auto insurance premiums for a car model is also affected by the choice of color of the car.  We 
suppose the frequency of accidents for each available factory color in the year 2001 is reported below: 
 
 
Color  Number of Cars          Accidents 
 
Red          29,333  289 
Blue          16,325  164 
White           2,304  17 
Brown           5,421  22 
Black          38,740  405 
Green           1,256  13 
Total         93,379  910 
 
We perform a 
2 -test at the 5% level for the null hypothesis that the probability of an accident is homogenous in 
the color of the car (Bernstein and Bernstein, 1999). 
 
We have 6 - 1 = 5 degrees of freedom.
12
  
 
H0  The probability of an accident is homogenous in the color of the car. 
H1  The probability of an accident is heterogeneous in the color of the car. 
 
We compute the expected number of accidents under 0H . 
 



ected
ectedobserved
exp
)exp( 22  
 
21.546860.0471881.99874217.990551.3243370.1514810.03456
/12.2400112.24001)-(13 377.5303/)377.5303405(52.8289/)52.828922(
22.45301/)22.4530117(159.0909/)159.0909164(285.8569/)285.8569289(
222
2222
5



 
 
Color  Expected Accidents 
 
Red  29,333 (910 / 93,379) = 285.8569 
Blue  159.0909 
White  22.45301 
Brown  52.8289 
Black  377.5303 
Green  12.24001 
 
 
                                                 
11 The existence of database induces privacy concerns – especially with medical records.  Perhaps someone would not get an AIDS test, because 
they might fear that, by doing so, they might make their life insurance premiums too expensive.  Further, because some diseases may be 
genetically related, there is the potential for forms of racial discrimination that is induced by access to medical records. 
12 Since we are using an average in our computations, we lose one degree of freedom.  
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Since, 07.11
*2
05.0,5
2    we reject ,0H  and infer that the color of the car affects the probability of 
an accident. 
 
Frequency and Severity 
 
 How do actuarial models work? We suppose that we have a loss event (death, credit default, auto accident
13
 
etc.) history for a risk class of contracts (humans, borrowers, automobiles etc.).  We suppose that we have data 
beginning in 2000 and that we are interested in a three year forecast of death starting in 2003 and continuing through 
the end of 2005.  We suppose that we have classified the contracts into risk class cohorts at the start of the year. 
 
               Deaths 
Year       Observations        Year 1       Year 2    Year 3 
 
2004  567            11 
2003  591             2  31 
2002  602             3  36 45 
2001  557             7  39 39 
2000  616             9  28 27 
 
How might we use these cohort observations to generate a forecast of survivorship? We average the 
proportion of survivorship in the cohorts for each year to form a first year forecast: 
 
567-11)/ 567  = 556 / 567 = 0.9806 
(591-2) / 591  = 589 / 591 = 0.996616 
(602-3) / 602   = 599 / 602 = 0.995017 
(557-7) / 557 = 550 / 557 = 0.987433 
(616-9) / 616 = 607 / 616 = 0.98539 
Average = 0.989011 
 
We employ the same method
14
 for years two and three: 
 
 0.944162    
 0.935216   0.860465 
 0.917415   0.847397 
 0.939935   0.896104 
Average 0.934182  Average 0.867989 
 
 
Next, we need to have some notion of losses given that a loss event (death, default, accident, etc.) has 
occurred.  The expected loss may vary across risk classes and over time. For instance, we might suppose that losses 
that occur are $0.30 in the first year, $0.40 in the second year, and $0.50 in the third year.  What do we forecast 
(project in losses) if we make $10 million in loans to this risk class? 
 
1-0.989011) * (10,000,000) * (0.30) 
(0.989011 - 0.934182) *(10,000,000) * (0.40) 
(0.934182-0.867989) * (10,000,000) * (0.50) 
                                                 
13In property and casualty insurance, it may be possible to have more than one loss event during the term of the insurance. We could employ the 
same method for the probability of two losses, three losses, etc.  We ignore this technicality for simplicity. 
14 We need to examine whether our estimated survival functions are non-increasing. It could happen that a survival function is decreasing due to 
averaging.  If this is the case, we may set the survival function to be constant over the relevant time period. 
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We forecast that we will have losses of $3,296.73 in the first year, $219,315.40 in the second year, and 
$330,967.20 in the third year. 
 
Losses Given an Event: 
 
How does an investigator estimate losses given an event (death, default, etc.)?  Risk class cohorts tend to be 
dependent – after all, the same observations may be in several risk class cohorts that are classified over different 
time periods.  Consequently, many actuaries choose to use non-parametric and distribution-free statistical methods 
(Kane 2004).   
 
 We give an example of the sign-rank test which is used to assess whether or not the distribution of losses is 
drawn from the same underlying distribution for two different risk classes.
15
 The sign-rank test is a rank-order test to 
determine if a population median is equal to a hypothesized value.  It is a nonparametric analogue of the one-sample 
t-test.  We substitute a median for a mean.  The null hypothesis is the median equals the hypothesized value.  We 
subtract the hypothesized median from each observation in the sample.  We rank observations in the sample in 
absolute value from 1 to n.  We average ranks for tied observations.  We sum the ranks with positive scores, (W+), 
and sum the ranks with negative scores (W-).  We consider all possible shuffled arrangements of the two samples. 
Under the null hypothesis, all shuffled arrangements of observations from both samples into synthetic samples that 
keep the same size as in the original samples, have an equal probability of occurring. We use this assumption 
operationally to calculate the probabilities that the test statistics, (W+), (W-), and Min {(W+), (W-)}, are as large as 
we have observed them. We define a p-value for each test statistic as the relative frequency shuffled arrangements 
with test statistics that are bigger than or equal to the test statistic from the observed sample (Kane 2004). These 
operational assumptions allow us to perform the analogous one-sided tests and two-sided tests to t-tests, respectively 
(Bernstein and Bernstein, 1999). 
 
We suppose that we have two distributions of losses given an event from two risk classes, sample 1and 
sample 2, both with one hundred observations. We calculate the differences of the absolute value of percentage 
changes and rank the differences, and restore the sign of the differences of their corresponding ranks.  We find that 
W+ =1,827 and W- = -3,223.  We perform a large sample Wilcoxon (sign-rank) test 
with 211210
~~:;~~:,01.0   HH .  We assume convergence under the central limit theorem to a 
normal distribution.  We give the value of the test statistic.   
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*
2
01.0Z =-2.57. So we fail to reject the null hypothesis.  
 
The level of significance is .0082.04918.05.0)4.2( ZP   
 
Thus, based solely on the result of this test, we would not use separate estimates for losses given an event for the 
two risk classes.  
 
 
 
                                                 
15 There are other techniques for the two sample problem.  For instance, Kane (1998) discusses the 
1L and L  (Kolmogorov-Smirnov) normed 
distribution-free tests. 
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POLICY DISCUSSION 
 
How can something so simple be so effective?  Is this what insurance companies really do? Yes, the simple 
method is the underpinning of most insurance premium estimates. But it is dubious that such a simple technique can 
forecast very accurately. So what kind of built-in safety nets have evolved with actuarial methods? We note that the 
existence of built-in safety-nets suggests that these items cannot really be forecast that well.   
  
The first built-in safety net is the mutual form of ownership where the policy holders own the company. 
This differs from a corporation or proprietorship. The mutual ownership structure makes sense in life and pension 
insurance, whereas a proprietorship or a corporation has less credible promises.  What would happen if the sole 
proprietor did not live longer than the policy holders? Similarly there are problems with a corporation. What would 
happen if a corporation went bankrupt?  The shareholders might use their limited liability to walk away from the 
companies long-term obligations to pensioners. 
 
A second safety-net mechanism is price fixing. We argue that insurance tends to be predominately state 
regulated and not federally regulated to allow price fixing (Kane and Smith, 1997). Under the Sherman Antitrust 
Act, price fixing is illegal per se (1944 U.S. Supreme Court ruling against the South Eastern Underwriters 
Association). The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 clarified the federal government‟s role in regulating insurance. 
This created pressure on states to change their insurance regulations to prevent federal challenges to price fixing. 
How might actuaries collude to fix insurance premiums? Actuaries may use the same model and the same data 
inputs to set premiums. Furthermore, there may be a state insurance commissioner who may make price fixing legal 
(Kane and Smith, 1997). 
 
Why do actuaries tend to overcharge and then rebate? It is incentive compatible for an actuary to 
overcharge customers and then rebate surviving policyholders through lower premiums. It is difficult to know what 
a fair premium is, but it might not be difficult to know what a sufficient premium is. Consequently, actuaries may set 
premiums that systematically overcharge almost everyone. Further it is difficult for a beneficiary to argue ex post 
that an insured person has been overcharged for life insurance in the year the insured person has died.  Overcharged 
policyholders who died have been removed from the mutual to the benefit of the survivors in the mutual.  
 
Why might state insurance regulators be willing accomplices? There may be an economic justification for 
price fixing. Price fixing creates an incentive for companies to undertake loss prevention and control activities that 
might otherwise be public goods where the insurance company cannot capture enough of the benefits to justify their 
efforts (Kane and Smith, 1997). By allowing price fixing, insurance regulators have less worry about insurance 
companies failing due to competition. Regulators also limit the number of competitors. To protect their economic 
rents, insurance company managers may allocate more capital, too. Insurance policies may be available to anyone 
who wants one (Kane and Smith, 1997). Otherwise adverse selection concerns might cause some members of risk 
classes not to be able to obtain policies -- even though almost everyone will have to pay a higher premium than 
would be fair on an expected value basis. Inasmuch as an insurance commissioner is more likely to be held 
accountable for failed insurers than for premiums being too high, it is not surprising that many state insurance 
commissioners are willing accomplices to price fixing (Kane and Smith, 1997). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We used examples to help identify adverse (beneficial) concerns.  We demonstrated that they are general 
problems. We showed how financial practitioners use actuarial models for assessment and forecasting applications. 
We discussed how insurance regulation has adapted to modeling limitations. 
 
________________________ 
The author thanks Christopher Cohen, George Jabbour, Harold Grant, Richard Kane, Morris McInnes, Kevin 
McLaughlin, Michael Smith, Morris Weisman, Xiaohong Yang, Liwen Yen, and participants of the 2004 IBER 
conference for comments and suggestions that have improved this manuscript. 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – March 2005                                                       Volume 3, Number 3 
 20 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Akerlof, George, 1970, “The Market for „Lemons‟: Quality Uncertainty and Market Mechanism,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 84: pages 488-500. 
2. Bernstein, Ruth and Stephen Bernstein, 1999, Schaum’s Outline of Theory and Problem of Elements of 
Statistics II: Inferential Statistics, McGraw-Hill, New York. 
3. Mark S. Blodgett and Stephen A. Kane, 2003, “Global Corporate Governance: Implications For A 
Functionally Harmonized Legal Infrastructure,” Journal of Business & Economics Research Vol. 1(6) pp. 
19-26. 
4. Caskey, John 1994, Fringe Banking: Check-Cashing Outlets, Pawnshops, and the Poor, Russell Sage 
Foundation, New York. 
5. Coffee, John, 1999, “The Future is History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate 
Governance and its Implications,” Northwestern University Law Review, spring, pages 641-707.  
6. Fazzari, Steven and R. Glenn Hubbard, 1988, “Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1: pages 143-195. 
7. Kane, Stephen and Michael Smith, 1997, “Price Fixing and the Rating Bureaus: The Southeast 
Underwriters from 1913-1943,” presented at the Insurance and Risk Management conference. 
8. Kane, Stephen, 1998, “Normed Distribution-Free Testing for Identically Distributed Residuals,” Advances 
in Financial Planning and Forecasting, Vol. 8, pages 95-111. 
9. Kane, Stephen 1999A, “Teaching Principal Agent Problems Using Examples from Popular Music,” 
Financial Practice and Education, pp. 116-120. 
10. Kane, Stephen, 1999B, “What Happened to the Utility Functions?  Imprecise Expectations of Security 
Prices,” International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 8, pages 165-176. 
11. Kane, Stephen, 2004, “Scientific Methods in Finance,” International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 
13, pp. 105-118, 2004. 
12. Kane, Stephen, Laosinchai, Parames, and Mark Muzere, 2003, “Bank Reserves and Liquidity,” presented at 
the 2003 Applied Business and Economic Research Conference in Acapulco Mexico. 
13. Kane, Stephen and Mark L. Muzure, 2004, “Asset Securitizations in the Banking Industry” forthcoming in 
International Business & Economics Research Journal. 
14. Perold, André F., 1988, "The Implementation Shortfall: Paper vs. Reality." Journal of Portfolio 
Management 14, no. 3 (spring), pages 4-9. 
15. Reichheld, Fredrick, 2001, The Loyalty Effect: The Hidden Force Behind Growth, Profits, and Lasting 
Value, Harvard Business School, Cambridge MA. 
16. Treynor, Jack, 1981, "What Does It Take to Win the Trading Game?" Financial Analysts Journal 
January/February.  
